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Abstract: 
 
This study examines the similarities between the current crisis and other systemic 
crises from the past. The purpose of our research is to discover whether previously used 
crisis management policies can constitute a referential in choosing the most effective policies 
for the management of the current crisis. 
This study highlights important similarities between the current crisis and those that 
occurred in the past in Norway (1991) and Japan (1997), using a cluster analysis in order to 
obtain homogeneous groups of crises.. Also, through a qualitative analysis of crisis 
management policies, the study stresses the need to learn from past lessons. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over time, systemic crises affected most countries, being, however, events 
that are characterized by great diversity in terms of initial macroeconomic 
conditions, causes and triggers, level of development of affected countries and their 
openness towards the rest of the world, existing institutional framework and external 
conditions, etc. (Cecchetti, Kohler and Upper (2009), Laeven and Valencia (2010), 
Thalassinos (2006), Thalassinos et al., (2010)).  
In these circumstances, achieving a robust research in the field of systemic 
financial crises, and particularly in the field of effective policies for the management 
of these crises, is extremely difficult if we consider that these are unusual events, 
often unpredictable, highly heterogeneous and influenced by many variables. The 
difficulty is even greater in quantitative research due to endogeneity, i.e. the 
inability to fully allocate macroeconomic results to a particular type of economic 
policy (for example, the fiscal one or the monetary one), as they relate to other 
influences, such as initial conditions, triggers, subsequent events, etc.  
One of the solutions offered in the literature to overcome these difficulties is 
the analysis of the effectiveness of crisis management policies in classes of crises as 
homogeneous in terms of causes, triggers, effects, costs and future developments. 
In this context, in the present study we assumed that the economic recovery 
policies have different effects during crises than when such events did not take place 
and we intend to achieve a multicriteria classification of systemic crises in 
homogeneous groups.  
Also, in our analysis, we follow the approach present in many studies in the 
literature (Cecchetti, Kohler and Upper (2009), Laeven and Valencia (2008)) and 
analyze crises within national borders because, regardless of their magnitude, they 
are often managed at the national level, even if they are regional or global, like the 
current one. 
On the concept of systemic crisis, the literature offers a multitude of 
approaches, but for the purposes of this study, we will work with the definition 
given by Laeven and Valencia (2010), who believe that a crisis is systemic if two 
conditions are met: "(1) - significant signs of  financial distress in the banking 
system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, bank 
liquidations) and (2) - significant banking policy intervention measures in response 
to significant losses in the banking system” (Laeven and Valencia (2010, p. 6)). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the literature review 
and theoretical foundations on the effectiveness of crisis management policies are 
found in Section 2, the research methodology and data in Section 3, results and 
interpretation in Section 4, and finally the concluding remarks are found in Section 
5. 
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2.  The Effectiveness of Crisis Management Policies 
 
Because the high costs of systemic crises require decisive action taken by 
authorities, researchers have turned increasingly more attention to the effectiveness 
of the policies designed to prevent and limit crises consequences. Among the most 
important policies, mentioned in the literature (Laeven and Valencia (2008), Jacome 
(2008), Richardson and Troost (2006), Detragiache and Giang Ho (2010)) are: 
liquidity support; assets purchase; government guarantees on deposits, deposit 
freeze, forbearance from capital requirements, government subsidies, debt 
cancellation, establishment of asset management companies, sales and 
recapitalizations of financial institutions assisted by the government. 
Regarding the effectiveness of these policies, Laeven and Valencia (2008, p. 
6-20) demonstrated, through a partial correlation analysis, that some are more 
efficient (the introduction of a general guarantee on all deposits), while others are 
costly and do not accelerate the process of economic recovery (liquidity support, 
government guarantees for certain financial institutions, forbearance from prudential 
regulations, bank closures and the establishment of asset management companies). 
Unlike the conclusions of the analysis performed by Laeven and Valencia 
(2008), Enoch (2000) considers that policies such as bank closures mitigate moral 
hazard problems and may be more effective in terms of involved costs than the 
attempt to recover through recapitalization or asset sells. 
Also, a strategy based on the liquidation of troubled banks may lead, in his 
view, to an improved performance of other banks in the system and to a cost-sharing 
between the government, on the one hand, shareholders and creditors, on the other 
hand, demonstrating, at the same time, the seriousness of the authorities in managing 
the banking system problems. On the other hand, the same author shows that bank 
closures, although effective in terms of cost, can be risky, the most significant 
consequences being bank runs, disruptions in the flow of payments and reduced 
lending. 
At the same time, Baldacci, Mulas-Granados and Gupta (2009) studied the 
effectiveness of fiscal policies and found that the expansionist ones, based on 
increases in government consumption, are more effective in reducing the duration of 
the crisis than those who rely on public investment or on reduced income tax. On the 
other hand, the same authors show that public investments have the greatest impact 
on economic growth, if completed after the financial crisis. 
Also, one should bear in mind that policies for the effective management of 
a crisis depend, to a great extent, on its trigger. Thus, deposit withdrawals and bank 
runs can be managed by immediate liquidity support, by expanding government 
guarantees on deposits or by temporarily suspending depositors right to withdraw 
their deposits, while serious solvency problems can be managed through the 
administration of those institutions by supervisory authorities and through assisted 
mergers or liquidations (Laeven and Valencia, 2008, p. 14). 
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The conclusions of the above-mentioned studies are based on qualitative 
analysis and partial correlation analysis between management policies, on the one 
hand, and indicators measuring the costs systemic crisis, on the other. 
A lack of accuracy of these studies refers to the difficulty in assessing the 
effectiveness of policies adopted by governmental, monetary and prudential 
authorities. Specifically, these studies fail to overcome a serious problem consisting 
in the fact that some of mentioned policies are endogenous to specific economic 
events, while others, such as those adopted by the supervisory authorities, often 
overlap fiscal policies or changes of normative acts, whose impact on the economy 
is difficult to assess. 
Thus, as shown by Richardson and Troost (2006), policy endogeneity and 
simultaneous changes, on multiple dimensions, of the management policies, prevent 
the attribution of macroeconomic results to specific policies adopted. To avoid these 
problems, the authors proposed a "quasi-experimental econometric strategy”, which 
involves identifying a group of banks that operate in similar economic and 
regulatory conditions, but were exposed to different management policies (in their 
study, the authors chose to analyze a group of banks in two U.S. states, and the 
period under review is the 1929-1930 crisis). Using this methodology, comparing 
the results of various management policies can lead to conclusions unaffected by the 
endogeneity problem. Therefore, in order to assign differences in efficiency to 
differences in adopted policies, scientists need homogeneous groups of elements 
(banks / states)  to analyze and exogenous policies. 
The author's conclusion is that monetary interventionism, which implies 
providing large-scale loans to banks that are facing difficulties, including when the 
related guarantees are less liquid, mitigates bank panics, reduces the bankruptcy rate 
for credit institutions and minimizes the costs of the crisis. 
 
3.  Research Methodology and Data 
 
The cluster analysis we used in this study is a classification technique 
characterized by the fact that the inclusion of items in a given cluster (or group) is 
done gradually and without “a priori” knowing the number of clusters. Also, two 
fundamental criteria must be met: 
 
 elements grouped in each class are as similar in terms of their specific 
characteristics;  
 elements grouped in a class differentiate as much as those grouped in any 
other class. 
 
We chose the hierarchical classification method proposed by Ward because, 
with this method, the principle underlying the classification of items in clusters is to 
minimize variance within clusters and maximize the distance between the formed 
clusters. This method involves an agglomerative clustering algorithm and it uses an 
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analysis of variance approach to evaluate the distances between clusters. It starts out 
with a number of clusters equal with the number of items (n clusters of size 1) and 
continues by grouping these small clusters into larger ones, until all the observations 
are included into one cluster. At each step of the algorithm, clusters or observations 
are combined in such a way as to minimize the sum of squares of any two clusters 
that can be formed at each step.  
Since our analysis aims, precisely, to obtain as homogeneous groups, taking 
into account a multitude of variables, we believe that the described method serves its 
intended purpose. 
This study uses the systemic crises resolution database developed by Laeven 
and Valencia (2008), and adds to this database a number of baseline variables 
regarding the initial conditions and subsequent macroeconomic developments for a 
number of 37 systemic crises that occurred during 1980-2003. Also, the database is 
supplemented with data on 23 crises that occurred since 2007, as part of the current 
global crisis, characterized by Laeven and Valencia (2010) them as: a) - systemic 
crises and b) - "borderline cases", i.e. events that meet a large number, but not all, of 
the characteristics that, according to the authors, define a systemic crisis. 
Since the limits for the indicators that define a systemic crisis are not 
rigorously substantiated by the respective authors, but also because of the similarity 
factors are dominant comparing to those of differentiation, we chose to include 
"borderline cases" events in the analysis. The classification of crises in clusters will 
confirm or refute our choice. 
We classified the systemic crises depending on a number of variables 
included in the following categories: 
 
 variables on the development of the country where the crisis manifested: 
GDP per capita recorded the year before the crisis; 
 variables on macroeconomic conditions prior to the manifestation of the 
crisis: the GDP growth rate; inflation; interest rates; the exchange rate 
against the U.S. dollar; the exchange rate based on purchasing power parity; 
the financial intermediation, as measured by the ratio of banking deposits to 
GDP; the current account deficit as percentage of GDP; 
 variables related to external conditions in the year before the crisis: world 
GDP growth; the occurrence of other crises; 
 variables on economic developments in the first two years after the onset 
of the crisis: the manifestation of a currency crisis in that period; the 
evolution of international liquidity as measured by total international 
reserves (excluding gold); GDP growth; inflation; the exchange rate against 
the U.S. dollar; the exchange rate based on purchasing power parity. 
 
Data sources are World Economic Outlook and IMF International Financial 
Statistics. 
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Each of these variables is standardized as Z score (converted into a variable 
with the  mean equal to 0 and the standard deviation equal to 1). By using this 
process, all variables will have the same unit and same weight in the model. 
We did not introduced in the cluster analysis, as Cecchetti, Kohler and 
Upper (2009) did in a study of a smaller number of systemic crises,  the response of 
the authorities to the crisis, i.e. the policies that have been used, because we intend 
to analyze these management policies within the resulted clusters. 
 
4.  Results and Interpretation 
 
The sample we analyzed consists of 60 systemic crises that manifested in 
the period 1980-2008. We classified these crises using Ward's method. 
The results of the cluster analysis are represented by a dendogram (chart no. 
1). As the number of clusters into which crises are grouped is not initially known, 
this element was not specified in the model. 
Thus, chart no. 1 shows the grouping of crisis based on their similarity and 
gives a measure of the magnitude of differences between clusters.  
In the first stage of the algorithm, the most similar crises were grouped, the 
distance between them being represented on the horizontal axis of the chart. In later 
stages, the formed groups are structured in new larger groups, on the same principle. 
Choosing the number of clusters and hence the distances between the 
elements within a cluster depends on the decision of the analyst. Also, the number of 
clusters may remain anonymous, and, in this situation, a successive grouping of 
smaller classes in larger ones is made. Based on this methodology we drew chart no. 
1, in which the names of the countries and the years of the crises are shown on the 
vertical axis. 
Crises which manifested after 2007 and which were considered by Laeven 
and Valencia (2010) as "borderline cases" are capitalized, in order to check their 
separate grouping. 
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Chart no. 1 - Dendogram resulting from Ward's classification method 
              
           0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label                Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------
+---------+ 
 
  Austria_2008           1   ─┐ 
  Belgium_2008            2   ─┤ 
  FRANCE_2008           14   ─┤ 
  Denmark_2008         3   ─┤ 
  Norway_1991           49   ─┤ 
  Japan_1997            42   ─┤ 
  Great Britain_2008   12   ─┤ 
  United States_2008    13   ─┼─┐ 
  Irland_2008           6   ─┤ │ 
  SWEDEN_2008           22   ─┤ │ 
  SWITZERLAND_2008          23   ─┤ ├─────┐ 
  Germany_2008          4   ─┤ │     │ 
  Netherlands _2008           10   ─┘ │     │ 
  Mongolia_2008          9   ─┬─┘     │ 
  RUSSIA_2008            19   ─┘       ├─┐ 
  Chile_1981            31   ─┐       │ │ 
  Colombia_1982         32   ─┼───┐   │ │ 
  Ghana_1982            39   ─┘   │   │ │ 
  Latvia_2008           7   ─┬─┐ ├───┘ │ 
  Nicaragua_2000        48   ─┘ │ │     │ 
  GREECE_2008           15   ─┐ │ │     │ 
  SPAIN_2008           21   ─┤ ├─┘     ├─────────┐ 
  Iceland_2008           5   ─┼─┤       │         │ 
  Ukraine_2008          11   ─┤ │       │         │ 
  SLOVENIA_2008         20   ─┤ │       │         │ 
  HUNGARY_2008          16   ─┤ │       │         │ 
  PORTUGAL_2008       18   ─┤ │       │         │ 
  Sri Lanka_1989        53   ─┘ │       │         │ 
  KAZAKHSTAN_2008       17   ───┘       │         │ 
  Luxembourg_2008         8   ───────────┘         │ 
  Colombia_1998         33   ─┐                   │ 
  Paraguay_1995         50   ─┼─┐                 │ 
  Korea_1997            43   ─┘ ├───────┐         │ 
  Indonesia_1997        40   ───┘       │         │ 
  Turkey_2000           56   ─┐         │         │ 
  Ukraine_1998          57   ─┼─┐       │         ├───────┐ 
  Lithuania_1995        45   ─┘ │       │         │       │ 
  Argentina_1995        25   ─┐ ├─┐     ├─┐       │       │ 
  Czech Republic_1996   35   ─┤ │ │     │ │       │       │ 
  Bolivia_1994          27   ─┼─┘ │     │ │       │       │ 
  Jamaica_1996          41   ─┤   │     │ │       │       │ 
  Latvia_1995           44   ─┤   │     │ │       │       │ 
  Cote d'Ivoire_1988    34   ─┘   │     │ │       │       │ 
  Philippines_1997      51   ─┐   ├─────┘ │       │       │ 
  Thailand_1997         55   ─┤   │       │       │       │ 
  Malaysia_1997         46   ─┤   │       ├───┐   │       │ 
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(cont’d)   0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label                Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------
+---------+ 
  Finland_1991          38   ─┼─┐ │       │   │   │       ├──────────
─────────┐ 
  Sweden_1991           54   ─┤ │ │       │   │   │       │          
         │ 
  Argentina_2001        26   ─┤ │ │       │   │   │       │          
         │ 
  Russia_1998           52   ─┤ ├─┘       │   │   │       │          
         │ 
  Dominican Rep_2003    36   ─┤ │         │   ├───┘       │          
         │ 
  Mexico_1994           47   ─┤ │         │   │           │          
         │ 
  Uruguay_2002          58   ─┘ │         │   │           │          
         │ 
  Bulgaria_1996         30   ───┘         │   │           │          
         │ 
  Venezuela_1994        59   ─────────────┘   │           │          
         │ 
  Ecuador_1998          37   ─────────────────┘           │          
         │ 
  Brazil_1990           28   ─┬─────────┐                 │          
         │ 
  Brazil_1994           29   ─┘         ├─────────────────┘          
         │ 
  Argentina_1989        24   ───────────┘                            
         │ 
  Vietnam_1997          60   ────────────────────────────────────────
─────────┘ 
 
In Chart no. 1 we can see that most of the crises that occurred after 2007 
are grouped in the initial stage, indicating a high degree of similarity between them. 
However, in the same initial stage, we see that other crises, manifested in the past, 
are grouped with current events. 
Thus, the results that we got partially confirms those obtained by Cecchetti, 
Kohler and Upper (2009), according to which current events are unique. These 
events have, indeed, according to our analysis, a high degree of dissimilarity 
compared to most other major systemic crisis, but there are similar events in the past 
that may constitute a referential for authorities in choosing the most effective 
management policies for the current crisis. In our opinion, the current financial crisis 
combines characteristics of past crisis episodes with new ones, the latter being the 
consequence of profound transformations that have marked the financial world in 
recent years. 
However, current events from a number of countries (France, Greece, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland), 
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considered by Laeven and Valencia (2010) as „borderline cases” are not grouped 
separately depending on the variables we included in the analysis. Thus, our 
conclusion is that they can be analyzed together with other crises that occurred since 
2007, in a similar manner. 
Regarding the similarities of current events with other crises manifested in 
the past, we see in chart no. 1 an initial grouping (indicating a high degree of 
similarity) of the current crisis manifested in Austria, Belgium, France, Denmark, 
UK, USA, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany and Netherlands with crises that 
manifested in Norway in 1991 and Japan in 1997. Since this is the most significant 
grouping of current events with past crisis (the degree of similarity is high and 
current events in many states are present in this cluster), we consider appropriate to 
chose the events in Japan (1997) and Norway (1991) as a referential in analyzing the 
efficiency of the management policies used in the current global crisis. In other 
words, since these past events have the greatest degree of similarity with the current 
events, we expect the policies and instruments that have yielded good results in the 
management of past events to have a high degree of efficiency in the management of 
the current crisis too. 
These results are consistent with those obtained in the studies conducted by 
Borio, Vale and von Peter (2010) which examines the authorities' response to the 
current crisis and compares it to that given by the Nordic states’ authorities, in the 
crisis from the early '90s. Our results are also consistent with those obtained by 
Takeo and Kashzap (2008) and Barbu, Dardac and Boitan (2009), who examines the 
programs implemented to support banks by public authorities in response to the 
current crisis by reference to the "Japanese lesson". 
Considering the obtained results, we will briefly present the main 
coordinates of the crisis management policies that were used in Norway (1991) and 
Japan (1997) and we will consider whether current crisis management policies 
follow the lessons of past crises. 
Regarding the Japanese crisis that was triggered in 1997, the major 
management policies used were: the protection of depositors of bankrupt banks; 
government intervention in the form of nationalizations, used very late in the crisis, 
after the failure of major banks; recapitalization by issuing preferred stock, a 
measure with limited success; the establishment of asset management companies; 
mechanisms for resolving bank failures; Takenaka plan (which imposed a series of 
measures, including rigorous assessment of bank assets, a ban on unrealistic data 
declared by banks and plans to recapitalize banks (Barbu, Dardac and Boitan, 
2009)). 
Regarding crisis management policies used in Norway (1991), considered 
by many authors as exemplary  (Borio, Vale and von Peter, 2010), they consisted, in 
particular, of: substantial capital injections made quickly after the announcement of 
bank difficulties; restructuring and recapitalizations of banks; management 
dismissals and restrictions on operations for banks that have experienced problems; 
liquidations and closures of small banks, faced significant challenges, together with 
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guarantees issued on all their deposits by the guarantee schemes; immediate 
establishment of a government insurance fund to provide liquidity to the deposit 
guarantee fund, after the exhausting of its resources; more restrictive accounting 
standards and lack of exceptions from prudential requirements for financial 
institutions. 
Compared with the policies that were used to manage the crises in Japan and 
Norway, the interventions of authorities in the states affected by the current crisis 
are mainly represented by: the injection of liquidity with the aim to support financial 
institutions; insurance programs and the purchase of troubled assets; government 
guarantees on bank assets; increased amounts covered by deposit guarantees 
schemes; bank recapitalization and restructuring. 
These are the main coordinates of the crisis management policies, which are 
found in most of the analyzed states and, in our opinion, they indicate the concern of 
the authorities to support the banking capital. However, the rapidity with which 
these programs were implemented highlights that authorities are aware of the 
importance of fast action, learned from past crises. On this issue, Borio, Vale and 
von Peter (2010) show that, in the management of the current crisis, the intervention 
was even faster that that used in the Nordic countries in response to the crisis from 
the '90s. Also, the fact that, in the current crisis, liquidity support operations have a 
leading role highlights the awareness of the beneficial role that these interventions 
had in past events. 
However, actions taken in response to the current crisis do not seem to make 
an equally important emphasis on limiting moral hazard, as government control and 
ownership, management dismissals or penalties on shareholders play a less 
important role in the management of the current crises than in previous episodes to 
which we refer in this study. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
Using systems for unsupervised recognition of forms (cluster analysis), this 
study examines the similarities of the current crisis with other systemic crisis that 
occurred in the past. The purpose of this exercise is to discover whether crisis 
management policies previously used can constitute a referential in choosing the 
most effective policies for the management of the current crisis. The results indicate 
important similarities between current events and crises that manifested in  the past 
in Norway (1991) and Japan (1997). 
Also, the management policies used in the current crisis shows that 
government and monetary authorities have learned something from the lessons of 
the past. 
However, both researchers and practitioners are still seeking the answer to 
the question "How will be the end of the current crisis that seriously threatens the 
overall stability of the financial world and, particularly, that of the Euro area?". The 
answer is, indeed, extremely difficult. It's like a three-dimensional chess game in 
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which economic, financial and political factors are interacting. The answer to this 
question must be an argued one and, from this perspective, can be a starting point 
for future research. 
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